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Abstract
We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information
about ﬁnitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz (2001)
that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irre-
ducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover,
the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when
feasibility is deﬁned with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be in-
centive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir, and
Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with
exact feasibility. We ﬁrst prove that the results in Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz (2001) are
still valid without free-disposal. Then, motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution, we
adapt the incentive compatibility property introduced in Krasa and Yannelis (1994) and we
prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying
that contracts of competitive or core allocations are enforceable.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D51; D82
Key words: Large exchange economies, Differential information, Competitive and Core
allocations, Incentive compatibility
IThe ﬁnancial support of the GIP ANR (project “croyances”) and of the Fondation du Risque (chaire Groupama)
is gratefully acknowledged. This work was partially done while V .F. Martins-da-Rocha was visiting the Dipartimento
di Matematica e Informatica of the Università degli Studi di Perugia. We thank the audience of the First General
Equilibrium Workshop at Rio. Section 6 dealing with contract enforcement and coalitional incentive compatibility
has beneﬁted from discussions with J. Correia-da-Silva, W. Daher, F. Forges, C. Hervès-Beloso, E. Moreno-García,
K. Podczeck, Y. Vailakis and N. C. Yannelis.
Corresponding author
Email addresses: victor.rocha@fgv.br (V . Filipe Martins-da-Rocha), angeloni@dipmat.unipg.it
(Laura Angeloni)
Chaire Groupama, Fondation du Risque December, 20081. Introduction
Radner (1968) introduced differential information in the general equilibrium model of
Arrow and Debreu (1954). He considers an economy which extends over two time periods
with uncertainty at the second period represented by a ﬁnite set of states of nature. Each
agent is characterized by a random initial endowment, a preference relation on contingent
consumption plans and a private information. The private information is represented by a
partition of the set of states. At the second period, a state of nature is realized but each agent
has incomplete information in the sense that he only knows to which atom of his partition
the true state belongs but he cannot discriminate states inside this atom. At the ﬁrst period,
a complete set of contingent contracts is available for trade and before they obtain any
information about the realized state of nature, agents arrange contracts which are assumed
to be consistent with respect to their private information. At the second period, uncertainty
is resolved, information is observed, contracts are executed and consumption takes place.
In this framework, Radner (1968) introduced a competitive equilibrium concept (Wal-
rasian expectations equilibrium) which was presented as an analogue concept to the Wal-
rasian equilibrium in Arrow–Debreu model with complete (symmetric) information. He
proved that, under standard assumptions (similar to those used in the existence results by
Arrow and Debreu (1954)) on agents’ characteristics, a Walrasian expectations equilibrium
always exists. Recently, this existence result was generalized in several directions: inﬁnitely
many commodities (see Podczeck and Yannelis (2007)), inﬁnitely many states (see Hervès-
Beloso, Martins-da-Rocha, and Monteiro (2007)) and unbounded consumption sets (see
Daher, Martins-da-Rocha, and Vailakis (2007)).
Yannelis (1991) introduced a cooperative equilibrium concept, called the private core,
which is an analogue concept to the core for an economy with complete (and symmetric)
information, and proved that under appropriate assumptions, the private core is always
non-empty. In the deﬁnition of the private core, when a coalition blocks an allocation, each
member in the coalition uses only his own private information. This cooperative concept of
equilibrium has some interesting properties: Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993) proved that
allowing individuals to make redistributions of their initial endowments, based only on their
own private information, results in equilibrium allocations that are always Bayesian incen-
tive compatible and also takes into account the informational advantage of an individual.
The private core is the appropriate notion of core when the traders do not want to exchange
information or when they do not have access to any communication system. When traders
are allowed to fully share their information, the appropriate core concept is the weak ﬁne
core introduced by Yannelis (1991) (see also Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993) and Glyco-
pantis and Yannelis (2005)).
For economies with complete information, Aumann (1964) proved that competitive and
core allocations coincide, provided that there is a continuum of traders. The existence of
such allocations was studied by Aumann (1966) and Hildenbrand (1970). An extension
of these results to economies with differential information was proposed by Einy, Moreno,
and Shitovitz (2001). They show that, if an economy is irreducible, then a competitive (or
Walrasian expectations) equilibrium exists and, moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium
allocations coincides with the private core. However, to obtain these results they allow
for free disposal on the feasibility (market clearing) constraints. This was motivated by an
example provided by Einy and Shitovitz (2001) of an economy with differential information
which has a competitive equilibrium with free disposal, but if the feasibility constraints are
2imposed with an equality, then the economy does not have a competitive equilibrium where
prices of all contingent contracts for future delivery are non-negative. We claim that this
is not economically inconsistent. If there is a state s that no agent can identify, then the
contract delivering one unit of a good ` contingent to the realization of the state s cannot be
purchased by any trader. The fact the price p(s,`) may be negative is irrelevant, what matter
are prices of tradeable contracts. Another reason for considering feasibility constraints with
free disposal is the version of Fatou’s Lemma used in Hildenbrand (1970) to prove existence
of competitive equilibrium. There, arguments are based on a version of Fatou’s Lemma
proved by Schmeidler (1970) where free disposal plays a crucial role.
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the results in Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz
(2001) are still valid if the feasibility constraints are imposed with equality. Using a more
general version of Fatou’s Lemma (proved by Balder and Hess (1995)) and a generalization
of Hildenbrand’s result by Cornet, Topuzu, and Yildiz (2003), we prove that if an economy is
irreducible, then a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium exists and moreover,
the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. We also deal
with another issue: contracts enforcement at the second period. There is a detailed dis-
cussion in Daher, Martins-da-Rocha, and Vailakis (2007) (see also (Podczeck and Yannelis,
2007, Section 4)) about the relationship between the execution of contracts and incentive
compatibility properties. When free disposal is allowed, Radner (1968) himself realized that
this assumption may be problematic in the context of asymmetric information. Indeed, the
total amount to be disposed of might not be measurable with respect to the information
partition of a single agent.1 This is the main reason why competitive allocations with free
disposal may not be incentive compatible (see Glycopantis, Muir, and Yannelis (2002) for
an example). We adapt the notion of coalitional incentive compatibility introduced by Krasa
and Yannelis (1994) and we prove that every Pareto optimal allocation, satisfying feasibil-
ity constraints with equality is coalitional incentive compatible, implying that contracts of a
competitive or core allocations are enforceable.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework and
outlines the basic model. In Section 3, we introduce assumptions under which existence of
competitive allocations and core equivalence will be proved. The proofs follow in Section 4
and Section 5 respectively. Section 6 is devoted to the issue of contract enforceability and its
relationship with coalitional incentive compatibility.
2. The model
We consider a pure exchange economy with a continuum of agents represented by a ﬁnite
positive measure space (T,,), where T is a set which represents agents,  is a -algebra
on T which represents coalitions, and  is a non-atomic positive and ﬁnite measure on 
satisfying (T) = 1. If E 2  is a coalition then (E) represents the fraction of agents which
belong to E.
The economy extends over two time periods  2 f0,1g. There is uncertainty over the
possible state of nature that may realize at  = 1 represented by a ﬁnite set 
. Consumption
of a ﬁnite set L of goods takes place at  = 1 but agents arrange contingent contracts at
 = 0 where there is a complete set of contingent contracts for future delivery of each good.
1More precisely, the total amount to be disposed of may not coincide with the sum of private measurable con-
tingent contracts.
3At  = 1 an agent t has an incomplete information about which state of nature actually
occurred. This information is described by a partition t of 
: if ! is the true state of nature,
agent t cannot discriminate the states in the (unique) element of t containing !. The -
algebra generated by t is denoted by Ft and we denote by Xt the set of Ft-measurable
functions x : 
 ! RL
+. For every ! 2 
 we let Et(!) be the unique atom of Ft (or unique
element of t) containing !.
Following the model introduced by Radner (1968)2 the information of an agent places
a restriction on his feasible trade in the sense that each agent t is constrained to choose a
contingent contract x : 
 ! RL
+ measurable with his private information Ft. In other words
he chooses plans in the consumption set Xt. Agent t knows at  = 0 that at  = 1 and state
! he will have an initial endowment et(!) 2 RL
+. We assume that he can observe his initial
endowment, i.e., the function et is Ft-measurable. The ex-ante preference relation about
contingent plans at  = 0 is represented by a correspondence Pt : Xt ! 2Xt. If x 2 Xt is a
contingent plan then Pt(x) represents the set of plans y 2 Xt that are strictly preferred to x.
An economy E is then deﬁned by a family
E = (Ft,Pt,et)t2T.
Remark 2.1. An economy is said to have preference relations represented by expected utili-
ties if for each agent t 2 T, there exist
1. a strictly positive3 probability measure qt on 
 which represents his prior beliefs, and
2. a state dependent utility function ut : 
RL
+ ! R satisfying the following properties
(a) the mapping t 7! qt(!) is -measurable for each state ! 2 
;4
(b) the mapping (t, x) 7! ut(!, x) is B(RL
+)-measurable;
(c) the mapping ! 7! ut(!, x) is Ft-measurable for every x 2 RL
+;
(d) the mapping x 7! ut(!, x) is continuous and strictly increasing5 on RL
+;
such that







Since the space 
 is ﬁnite, there exists a ﬁnite collection (F i)i2I of -algebras on 
 such
that
fFt : t 2 Tg = fF
i : i 2 Ig.
We assume that the set Ti  T deﬁned by
T
i := ft 2 T : Ft = F
ig
belongs to T and that the family (Ti)i2I forms a partition of T satisfying (Ti) > 0 for
each i. Therefore there is a ﬁnite set I of information types and every agent t 2 Ti is of
information type i in the sense that Ft = F i.
2We also refer to Radner (1982).
3In the sense that for each ! 2 
, we have qt(!) > 0.
4We abuse notation writing qt(!) instead of qtf!g.
5A mapping f : RL
+ ! R is strictly increasing if f (x + y) > f (x) for every x, y 2 RL
+ with y 6= 0.
4Throughout the paper we use the following notations. For each i 2 I, the space of F i-
measurable functions x : 
 ! RL
+ is denoted by Ei
+ and the linear space Ei
+   Ei
+ is denoted
by Ei. Denote by Ei
++ the interior of Ei
+ relative to Ei, i.e., an F i-measurable function x
belongs to Ei
++ if and only if x(!) 2 RL
++ for each state ! 2 
. Observe that for each t 2 Ti,
the consumption set Xt coincides with the set Ei
+. The space
P
i2I Ei is denoted by E and
is called the commodity space. The (positive) cone
P
i2I Ei
+ is denoted by E+. Since E may
be identiﬁed with a vector subspace of R
L, it may be endowed with the cone E \ R
L
+ .
Observe that E+ is a subset of E \R
L
+ but in general,6 it is a strict subset. A vector x 2 E+
is said strictly positive, denoted by x  0, if for every ! 2 
, the vector x(!) belongs to
RL
++.
Deﬁnition 2.1. An integrable function from T to R
L
+ is called an assignment and the space
of assignments is denoted by S . The space of integrable selections of the correspondence
X, i.e., the space of integrable functions x : t 7! xt from T to E such that xt 2 Xt for -a.e.
t 2 T, is denoted by SX. A vector x in SX is called a private assignment and it is said






2. free-disposal feasible if











Throughout the rest of the paper we only consider standard economies in the sense given
by the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3.1. An economy E is said standard if
(S.1) the initial endowment assignment e : t 7! et belongs to SX;
(S.2) the aggregate initial endowment e(T) =
R




(S.3) preference relations are measurable,7 irreﬂexive,8 transitive,9 continuous10 and stri-
ctly monotone.11
6If for each ! 2 




7In the sense that
f(t, x, y) 2 T  E  E : x, y 2 Xt and y 2 Pt(x)g 2 B(E)B(E).
8In the sense that for every x 2 Xt, x 62 Pt(x).
9In the sense that for every x, y 2 Xt, if y 2 Pt(x) then Pt(y)  Pt(x).
10In the sense that for every x 2 Xt, the set Pt(x) and the set P 1
t (x) := fy 2 Xt : x 2 Pt(y)g are open in Xt.
11In the sense that for every x, y 2 Xt, if y 6= 0 then x + y 2 Pt(x).
5Remark 3.1. Conditions (S.1) and (S.3) are standard. Condition (S.2) is satisﬁed if for each
information type i 2 I, the aggregate initial endowment e(Ti) of the coalition Ti is strictly
positive, i.e., e(Ti)(!) 2 RL
++ for each ! 2 
. When information is symmetric among agents,
Condition (S.2) is automatically satisﬁed if the aggregate initial endowment e(T) is strictly
positive, i.e., e(T)(!) 2 RL
++ for each ! 2 
.
Remark 3.2. If preference relations are represented by expected utilities then they are auto-
matically measurable, irreﬂexive, transitive, strictly monotone and continuous.
The following irreducibility condition was introduced in McKenzie (1959) for economies
with ﬁnitely many agents. It was extended to large economies by Hildenbrand (1974).12
Deﬁnition 3.2. An economy is said irreducible if for every feasible private assignment x 2 SX
and for every two disjoints coalitions A,B 2  such that (A) > 0, (B) > 0, and A[ B = T,














yt 2 Pt(xt) for -a.e. t 2 A.
We let F c :=
V
i2I F i be the meet13 -algebra representing the common knowledge in-
formation of the grand coalition I, and we denote by Ec (Ec
+) the space of F c-measurable
functions from 
 to RL (resp. RL
+). Observe that Ec is a subspace of each Ei. We propose
hereafter a condition on the initial endowment assignment which implies the irreducibility
condition.
Proposition 3.1. Let E be a standard economy such that there exists a private assignment
a 2 SX satisfying for -a.e. t 2 T,
0 6= at 2 E
c
+ and et(!)  at(!), 8! 2 
.
Then the economy is irreducible.
Proof. Let x 2 SX be a feasible private assignment and let two disjoints coalitions A,B 2 
such that (A) > 0, (B) > 0, and A[B = T. We let a(B) :=
R
B ad, observe that a(B) 2 Ec
+.
We deﬁne the function y : T ! E by




(A)a(B) if t 2 A
et if t 2 B.
We deﬁne the function z : T ! E by
8t 2 T, zt =

et if t 2 A
et   at if t 2 B.
12Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz (2001) proposed an extension of Hildenbrand’s irreducibility condition to
economies with differential information which is slightly different from the one we introduced below.
13If J is a subset of I then
V
j2J F j is the ﬁnest -algebra contained in each F j, j 2 J.














yt 2 Pt(xt) for -a.e. t 2 A.
Remark 3.3. Assume that for -a.e. t 2 T, we have et(!) 2 RL
++ for every ! 2 
. Then14
there exists a measurable function "(!) : T ! (0,1] such that et(!)  "t(!)1L.15 Let at be










then we have at 2 Ec
+, at 6= 0 and et  at, implying that the economy is irreducible.
4. Competitive allocations
At the ﬁrst period  = 0 there is a complete set of contingent contracts for future delivery
of each good. Therefore a price system is a function p : 
 ! RL where p(!,`) represents
the price at  = 0 of the contract delivering one unit of good ` if the state of nature at  = 1
is !. The budget set Bt(p) for agent t is then deﬁned by
Bt(p) := fxt 2 Xt : E[p  xt] ¶ E[p  et]g
where















This function is called the conditional price with respect to Ft or agent t’s conditional price.
Since agent t’s choices are constrained by his information, replacing the vector p by the
function E[pjFt] leads to the same opportunities in the sense that
Bt(p) = Bt(E[pjFt]).
Remark 4.1. This does not mean that agent t only observes the price vector E[pjFt]. Every
agent observes the same price vector p. However, for agent t, the conditional price E[pjFt]
is as relevant as the price p to make his optimal choice.
14For each ! 2 
, deﬁne the function "(!) by "t(!) = minf1,minfet(!,`): ` 2 Lg, where et(!,`) is the `-th
coordinate of et(!) 2 RL.
15If A is a subset of L then 1A denotes the vector in RL deﬁned by 1A(`) = 1 if ` 2 A and 0 elsewhere.
7In this section we extend to our model the deﬁnition of competitive equilibrium (or
Walrasian expectations equilibrium) introduced by Radner (1968), and discuss conditions
under which its existence can be guaranteed.
Deﬁnition 4.1. A pair (x,p) of a private assignment x 2 SX and price p : 
 ! RL is a
competitive equilibrium if
(a) for -a.e. t 2 T, the plan xt belongs to the budget set Bt(p) and is optimal in the sense
that Bt(p)\ Pt(xt) = ;; and
(b) x is feasible, i.e., for each possible realization ! 2 









A competitive allocation is a feasible private assignment x 2 SX for which there exists a
price p such that (x,p) is a competitive equilibrium.
Remark 4.2. If (x,p) is competitive equilibrium of a standard economy then the following
properties are satisﬁed:
1. for -a.e. t 2 T the budget set restriction is binding, i.e.,
E[p  xt] = E[p  et];
2. conditional prices are strictly positive, i.e.,





If for any state !, the event f!g belongs to F i for some agent i, then (1) implies that for
every ! 2 
, the spot price p(!) 2 RL
++. This property is not true in general: (Einy and
Shitovitz, 2001, Example 2.1) provide an example of a standard economy with differential
information for which there is no competitive equilibrium (x,p) satisfying p(!) 2 RL
+ for
every ! 2 
.
In Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz (2001) it is the deﬁnition of competitive equilibrium with
free-disposal (used by Radner (1982)) that was extended to large economies.
Deﬁnition 4.2. A pair (x,p) of a private assignment x 2 SX and price p : 
 ! RL
+ is a
competitive equilibrium with free-disposal if it satisﬁes the previous property (a) together
with the following
(b’) x is free disposal feasible, i.e., for each possible realization ! 2 
, markets clear with











Remark 4.3. Observe that property (b’) can be rewritten as










In particular the plan z is not required to be compatible with the information available in the
market, i.e., it is not imposed that z belongs to E+. Observe moreover that in the deﬁnition
of a competitive equilibrium, every spot price p(!) is required to be nonnegative.
8It was proved in (Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz, 2001, Theorem A) that every irreducible
economy has a competitive equilibrium with free-disposal. We may think that in the context
of a pure exchange economy with differential information it is more reasonable to assume
inequality in the feasibility constraints since it allows to prove the existence of an equilibrium
price p satisfying p(!) 2 RL
+ for each !. However since each agent t 2 T can only make
Ft-measurable plans, it seems natural to only require that the conditional price E[pjFt]
with respect to the available information Ft is nonnegative, i.e., for each t 2 T, the vector
E[pjFt](!) belongs to RL
+. To illustrate this point, we propose to consider Example 2.1 in
Einy and Shitovitz (2001).
Example 4.1. Consider an economy E in which the space of traders is T = [0,3] with its
Borel subsets and the Lebesgue measure . The set of states of nature is 
 = f!1,...,!4g.
There is only one good, i.e., L = f`g and the space RL
+ is denoted by R+. There are three
information types, i.e., I = fi1,i2,i3g where
T
i1 = [0,1], T
i2 = (1,2] and T
i3 = (2,3].
Information is deﬁned by
F





All the agents in the economy have the same prior given by
8t 2 T, qt(!1) =
1
10








101 if ! 2 f!1,!2g




101 if ! 2 f!1,!3g





101 if ! 2 f!1,!4g
1=2 if ! 2 f!2,!3g.
The utility function of each agent is given by
8t 2 T, 8! 2 
, 8c  0, ut(!,c) =
p
c.
Einy and Shitovitz (2001) proved that there does not exist a competitive equilibrium (x,p)
where the price p is such that p(!)  0 for each !. However, (e,) is a competitive equilib-
rium where the price  is deﬁned by
(!1) = 2










Observe that (!1) < 0. However, the contract 1f!1g delivering one unit of the good contin-
gent to state !1 cannot be traded by any agent. In particular, no agent can take advantage
of this arbitrage opportunity. Indeed, consider for instance an agent t of information type i1.
He solves the following maximization problem:


















if ! 2 f!3,!4g.
Observe that E[jFt](!) > 0 for each ! 2 
.
We assert that if we replace the requirement that every equilibrium prices p(!) are non-
negative by the requirement that all conditional prices are nonnegative, then it is possible to
prove that every irreducible economy has a competitive equilibrium (with an equality in the
feasibility constraints).
Theorem 4.1. Every irreducible economy has a competitive equilibrium.
The existence result in Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz (2001) follows as a corollary of the
existence result in Hildenbrand (1974) which is based on a multidimensional Fatou’s Lemma
provided by Schmeidler (1970). In Schmeidler’s version of Fatou’s Lemma the positive cone
is the lattice cone Rn
+ of a ﬁnite dimensional Euclidean vector space Rn. In order to deal with
our positive cone E+ we propose a proof which relies on a generalization of Hildenbrand’s
existence result provided by Cornet, Topuzu, and Yildiz (2003). The later existence result is
based on a generalization of Schmeidler’s version of Fatou’s Lemma due to Balder and Hess
(1995).
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let E = (Ft,Pt,et)t2T be an irreducible standard economy. We recall
that E+ denotes the cone
P
i2I Ei
+ and E denotes the linear space generated by E+.
Claim 4.1. The cone E+ is convex, pointed and closed in E.
Proof of Claim 4.1. It is straightforward to check that the set E+ is convex and pointed. et
(an) be a sequence in E+ converging to a in E. For each n 2 N, there exists (ai
n)i2I 2 Q
i2I Ei
+ such that an =
P
i2I ai
n. Hence for each i 2 I, we have 0 ¶ ai
n(!,`) ¶ an(!,`) for
every (!,`) 2 
 L. Since the sequence (an(!,`)) converges to a(!,`) then the sequence
ai




+ such that the sequence (ai










where C = E+, t is the binary relation deﬁned by Pt and Y(t) =  C for every t 2 T.
Applying Corollary 3.1 in Cornet, Topuzu, and Yildiz (2003)16 there exists a triple (x,z,)
where x 2 SX is a private assignment, z 2  C and  : E ! R is a non-zero linear functional
such that
(a) for -a.e. t 2 T, (xt) ¶ (et) and y 2 Pt(xt) implies (y)  (xt);






From (b) it is immediate that (z) = 0 (since  C is a cone). From this, (a), and (c),
(xt) = (et) for almost all t follows directly. Moreover it follows from (b) that jE+  0 in
the sense that for every y 2 E+, we have (y)  0.
We claim that (e(T)) > 0. Indeed, assume by way of contradiction that (e(T)) = 0.
From Assumption (S.2), there exists ai 2 Ei
++ for each i such that e(T) =
P
i2I ai. Since
jE+  0, it follows that jEi
+ = 0 for each i, implying the contradiction  = 0. Let A = ft 2
T : (et) > 0g, this set belongs to  and (A) > 0.
Claim 4.2. For every t 2 A, y 2 Pt(xt) implies (y) > (et).
Proof. Let t 2 A and y 2 Pt(xt). From property (a) we already know that (y)  (et).
Assume by way of contradiction that (y) = (et). Since Pt(xt) is open in Xt there exists
 2 (0,1) such that y 2 Pt(xt). Then applying property (a) we get (y)  (et). This
yields a contradiction since (et) > 0.
Claim 4.3. The set A is of full measure, i.e., (A) = 1.
Proof of Claim 4.3. Assume by way of contradiction that B := T n A is such that (B) > 0.
Let ˜ x : T ! E+ be deﬁned by
8t 2 T





The function ˜ x is a private assignment, i.e., ˜ x 2 SX, it satisﬁes (˜ xt) = (xt) = (et),
Pt(˜ xt)  Pt(xt) and it is feasible. Then applying the irreducibility condition to ˜ x, there exist














yt 2 Pt(˜ xt) for -a.e. t 2 A.
16In Cornet, Topuzu, and Yildiz (2003) the space E is an Euclidean space RH for some ﬁnite set H. But their
result can be straightforwardly generalized to any ﬁnite dimensional linear space.










Since yt 2 Pt(˜ xt) we get from Claim 4.2 that (yt) > (et) = (˜ xt) for -a.e. t 2 A, and













which yields a contradiction.
Since preference relations are strictly monotone, we get from Claims 4.2 and 4.3 that
8i 2 I, 8y 2 E
i
+, y 6= 0 =) (y) > 0.
Since (zi) = 0 we get that for each i 2 I, zi = 0 and z = 0. We have thus proved that the





The linear functional  can be extended to R
L. In particular, there exists a function
p : 
 ! RL such that
8y 2 E, (y) = E[p  y].
It is now straightforward to prove that (x,p) is a competitive equilibrium of the economy E.
5. Core allocations
The notion below is a variant of the private core introduced in Yannelis (1991).
Deﬁnition 5.1. A feasible private assignment x 2 SX is a private weak core allocation for the
economy E if there do not exist a coalition S 2  with (S) > 0 and a private assignment y







and for -a.e. t 2 S, the plan yt is strictly preferred to xt, i.e., yt 2 Pt(xt).
The equivalence theorem in Aumann (1964) still prevails in the framework of differential
information.
Theorem 5.1. The sets of competitive and private weak core allocations coincide.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Clearly, any competitive allocation belongs to the private weak core.
To verify the converse, suppose x 2 SX is a private weak core allocation. Let ' : T ! 2E be
the correspondence given by
8t 2 T, '(t) = Pt(xt)[fetg.
12Then the set
R
T 'd is non-empty17 and convex because the measure space (T,,) is









where we recall that Ec
++ is the space of F c-measurable functions from 
 to RL
++. Indeed,
suppose the contrary. Then there are a v 2 Ec
++ (in particular v 6= 0) and an integrable








Set S = ft 2 T : g(t) 2 Pt(xt)g. By Assumption (S.3), the set S belongs to . By deﬁnition








In particular, since v 6= 0, we must have (S) > 0. Let e g : T ! E be given by




Observe ﬁrst that e g is a private assignment since Ec
+ is a subset of Ei
+ for every information
type i. Then
R
S e gd =
R
S ed, i.e., the assignment e g is feasible for the coalition S. Moreover,
e g(t) 2 Pt(g(t)) for -a.e. t 2 S because preferences are strictly monotone, whence e g(t) 2
Pt(xt) by transitivity. This contradicts the fact that x is a private weak core allocation.
It follows now from the separation theorem that there is a non-zero linear functional




'd, ()  (e(T))
and (y)  0 for every y 2 Ec
+. Following almost verbatim the arguments18 in Hildenbrand
(1974), we can prove that for -a.e. t 2 T,
y 2 Pt(xt) =) (y)  (et) and (xt) = (et).
Since preferences are strictly monotone, we deduce that for each information type i, we have
(z)  0 for each z 2 Ei




is not zero. The end of the proof is omitted since it follows almost verbatim the end of the
proof of Theorem 4.1.
When preference relations are represented by expected utilities, we may consider the
notion of private core allocations.
17For instance
R
T et(dt) belongs to this set.
18In particular applying (Hildenbrand, 1974, Proposition 6).
13Deﬁnition 5.2. Assume that preference relations are represented by expected utilities. A
feasible private assignment x 2 SX is a private core allocation for the economy E if there do
not exist a coalition S 2  with (S) > 0 and a private assignment y such that y is feasible







ft 2 S: ht(yt)  ht(xt)g = (S) and ft 2 S: ht(yt) > ht(xt)g > 0.
Obviously, a private core allocation is a private weak core allocation. The equivalence
theorem is still valid.
Theorem 5.2. Assume that preference relations are represented by expected utilities. The sets
of competitive and private core allocations coincide.
Proof. Clearly, a private core allocation is a private weak core allocation. Applying Theo-
rem 5.1, it is also a competitive allocation. To verify the converse, suppose x 2 SX is a
competitive allocation and suppose it is not a private core allocation. Then there exist a
coalition S 2  with (S) > 0 and a private assignment y such that y is feasible for the







ft 2 S: ht(yt)  ht(xt)g = (S) and ft 2 S: ht(yt) > ht(xt)g > 0.
Set S+ = ft 2 S: ht(yt)  ht(xt)g and S++ = ft 2 S: ht(yt) > ht(xt)g. Let p : 
 ! RL
be a non-zero price such that (x,p) is a competitive equilibrium. For -a.e. t 2 S++, the
contingent plan xt is optimal in the budget set Bt(p), implying that E[p  yt] > E[p  et].
For every " > 0 and for every t in S+, yt +"1 2 Pt(xt) since preference relations are strictly
monotone and transitive.19 It follows that for -a.e. t 2 S+, E[p yt]+"E[p1] > E[pet].






































This contradicts the feasibility of the assignment y for the coalition S.
19The contingent plan 1 is the function 1 : 
 ! RL deﬁned by 1(!) = 1L for every ! 2 
.
14We now adapt the deﬁnition of the weak ﬁne core introduced by Yannelis (1991) and
Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993) to the framework of exact feasibility constraints. We
ﬁrst observe that without any loss of generality, we can assume that the coarsest -algebra
containing each F i coincides with 2
. Now if J is a subset of I, we denote by F(J) the
coarsest -algebra containing each F j, j 2 J. In particular we have F(fig) = F i and
F(I) = 2
. Similarly, if S 2  is a coalition then we denote by F(S) the -algebra F(I(S))
where
I(S) := fi 2 I : (T
i \S) > 0g.
The set I(S) represents the informational types that are present in the coalition S and the
-algebra F(S) represents the information available to each agent of S if they share their
information.
Deﬁnition 5.3. A feasible assignment x is a weak ﬁne core allocation for the economy E if
there do not exist a coalition S 2  and an assignment y such that
1. for -a.e. t 2 S, the function yt is F(S)-measurable,







3. for -a.e. t 2 S, the plan yt is strictly preferred to xt, i.e., yt 2 Pt(xt).
Observe that no measurability constraints are imposed on a weak ﬁne core allocation.
As in Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz (2001), if we can extend the preference relations then the
weak ﬁne core of an economy E coincides (and is thus non-empty) with the private core of
the symmetrized economy E.
Deﬁnition 5.4. The preference relations of an economy E are said extendable if for -a.e.






1. the preference relations deﬁned by P are measurable, irreﬂexive, transitive, continu-
ous and strictly monotone;
2. the correspondence P
t extends Pt in the sense that Pt(x)  P
t (x) for every x 2 Xt.
Remark 5.1. If the preference relations are represented by expected utility functions then
they are automatically extendable.
Deﬁnition 5.5. If E is an economy with extendable preference relations, then we let E be









 for every t 2 T. The economy E is called the symmetrization of E.
Observe that the economy E is symmetric in the sense that every agent has the same
information. The proof of the following theorem is based on a result by Vind (1968) and
follows almost verbatim the proof of Proposition 5.1 in Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz (2001).
Theorem 5.3. If E is an irreducible economy with extendable preferences then the weak ﬁne
core of E coincides with the private core of the symmetrized economy E.
Remark 5.2. It follows as a corollary of Theorems 4.1, 5.1 and 5.3 that the weak ﬁne core of
an irreducible economy with extendable preferences is non-empty.
156. Contract enforcement and incentive compatibility
A competitive allocation as well as a private core allocation are ex-ante solutions cor-
responding to actions taken at  = 0. In order to address the issue of execution (or en-
forcement) of contracts at  = 1, we assume that there is an intermediary (a "government
institution" or a "market institution") that is responsible for the execution of contracts. In
this section we assume that the family (F i)i2I is common knowledge to agents. We also
restrict our attention to preference relations represented by expected utility functions.
At  = 1 a state of nature is realized. If the intermediary is able to identify the true state
then he can enforce the receipts and deliveries of commodities speciﬁed by the contracts
made at the previous date, i.e., each agent t receives the net trade zt(!) := xt(!)  et(!).




This implies that they are no issues concerning execution of contracts.
More interesting is the situation where the intermediary has an incomplete information
concerning the true state of nature. In that case, each agent t has to report his informa-
tion and claims for the corresponding net trade. However, agents may have incentives to
misreport their information. If ! is the realized state of nature, agent t should report his
information, i.e., any state in Et(!),20 but if for some other state t we have




ut(!, xt(t)  et(t)+ et(!)) > ut(!, xt(!))




then the intermediary cannot execute contracts. In general it is not possible to avoid such a
situation.
Now assume that there is a legal procedure that agents can use to prove that they are
not misreporting their information. Assume that this procedure is costly but that the cost
of such an action is repaid by agents whose misreporting can be revealed. This has two
consequences: ﬁrst an agent uses this legal procedure only if he is sure that he can detect
a misreporting and second an agent decides to misreport only if he is sure that he cannot
be detected by other agents. For this argument to be valid, each agent needs to know the
information structure of the others.
Recall that every agent in Ti = ft 2 T : Ft = F ig has the same information F i, therefore
an agent t 2 Ti alone cannot misreport a state since all the other agents in Ti can detect his
misreport. This implies that only a whole coalition Ti can misreport. More precisely, agents
of information type i have an incentive to misreport the realized event Ei(!) by announcing
the state  if
20Recall that whatever is the state a in Et(!) that agent t reports, he gets the same utility.
161. agents not in Ti cannot discern  and any possible state in Ei(!), i.e., for every j 6= i,
for -a.e.  2 T j, the set fg[ Ei(!) is a subset on an atom of F j;
2. almost every agent in Ti has an incentive to announce , i.e., for -a.e. t 2 Ti, we
have




ut(a,et(!)+ xt()  et()) > ut(a, xt(!)).
Naturally, there is no reason to restrict coalitions to be composed of agents of the same
information type. It may the case that all agents of information type i1 and i2 have an
incentive to commonly misreport the same state  when the realized state is !. In order
to agree to misreport, agents in Ti1 [ Ti2 have ﬁrst to agree on the set of possible realized
states of nature. We assume that agents of type i1 don’t want to share or reveal information
with agents of type i2 and vice versa. Therefore they have to agree on common knowledge
events. This leads us to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 6.1. Let ! 2 
, if i 2 I is an information type, then we let Ei(!) be the atomic
event in F i which contains !. If J  I then we denote by F J the meet -algebra ^j2JF j
which is interpreted as the common knowledge information of the coalition J of types. If
! 2 
 we let EJ(!) be the atomic event in F J which contains !.
According to this deﬁnition, the common knowledge information of the coalition S =
Ti1 [ Ti2, is that the realized state of nature belongs to Efi1,i2g(!). Since any agent wants
to reveal information to other agents, it must be the case that every agent of the coalition
S gains by announcing the state  instead of any possible realized state of nature in the






et(a)+ xt()  et() 2 RL
+
and
ut(a,et(a)+ xt()  et()) > ut(a, xt(a)).
If agents in S = Ti1 [ Ti2 decide to misreport by announcing  instead of any state in
Efi1,i2g(!), they must check if any agent  62 S can detect that  is not the realized state
of nature.21 But to do so, agents in the coalition S need to agree on what is agent ’s
information. The common knowledge of the coalition S is that any state a 2 Efi1,i2g(!) is a
possible candidate for the realized state of nature. Therefore, they must check that for every
a 2 Efi1,i2g(!), every agent  62 S cannot discern states a and , i.e.,
E
fi1,i2g(!)  E(), for -a.e.  62 S.
This leads us to the following concept of coalitional incentive compatibility. Actually, this
is not a new concept since it is the straightforward adaptation to economies with a contin-
uum of agents of the coalitional incentive compatibility condition introduced by Krasa and
Yannelis (1994).
21In particular, the information structure (F i)i2I must be common knowledge to all agents.
17Deﬁnition 6.2. A private assignment x 2 SX is said coalitional incentive compatible if there
is no coalition S 2  with (S) 2 (0,1) that has an incentive to misreport a state of nature.
A coalition S 2  has an incentive to misreport a state of nature if there exist states ! 6= 
such that
1. for -a.e.  62 S, agent  cannot discern state  and any state in22 EI(S)(!), i.e.,
fg[ EI(S)(!) is a subset of an atom of the information algebra F; in other words
E
I(S)(!)  E(), for -a.e.  62 S; (2)






et(a)+ xt()  et() 2 RL
+
and
ut(a,et(a)+ xt()  et()) > ut(a, xt(a)).
(3)
Remark 6.1. A necessary condition for a coalition S 2  to have an incentive to misreport a
state is that
I(S)\ I(T nS) = ;. (4)
Condition (4) comes from the fact that an agent t with information type i cannot misreport
a state to another agent t0 whose information type is the same.
Remark 6.2. Deﬁnitions 1 and 2 in Krasa and Yannelis (1994) are speciﬁed for the case of
one commodity. In Section 3.4, they extend the deﬁnition to the case of more than one
commodity by requiring that a deviation should improve the deviating coalition in a set of
states that is common knowledge information to the deviating coalition. This is exactly our
condition (3) in Deﬁnition 6.2. They don’t state explicitly that members of the complemen-
tary coalition cannot detect the misreport according to any state in the event that is common
knowledge to the deviating coalition (i.e., our condition (2) in Deﬁnition 6.2). However,
this is the only interpretation that is consistent with the proof and the objective of their
deﬁnition.
Remark 6.3. A cautious reader will notice that our concept of coalitional incentive compat-
ibility is slightly different than the weak coalitional Bayesian incentive compatibility intro-
duced in Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993) (see also Hervès-Beloso, Moreno-García, and
Yannelis (2005) and Podczeck and Yannelis (2007)) where it is imposed that in order to mis-
report state ! by announcing , agents in a coalition S should have the same information
about the realized state of nature, i.e., for a.e. t 2 S
Et(!) = E
I(S)(!), for -a.e. t 2 S.
We consider that a coalition could misreport even if they do not have the same information.
What matters is that they agree to misreport on the common knowledge information.
22We recall that for each coalition E 2 , the set I(E) is the set of information types present in the coalition, i.e.,
I(E) = fi 2 I : (E \ Ti) > 0g.
18Remark 6.4. The coalitional incentive compatibility condition can be stated in terms of
interim expected utility instead of ex-post utility. This leads to the concept of coaltional
Bayesian incentive compatibility. We refer to Hahn and Yannelis (1997), Hahn and Yannelis
(2001) and Glycopantis and Yannelis (2005) for details.
We next show that competitive or core allocation fulﬁlls the coalitional incentive com-
patibility. Actually, this is result is true for Pareto optimal allocations.
Deﬁnition 6.3. A feasible assignment x 2 SX is said Pareto optimal if there does not exist a
feasible assignment y 2 SX such that
ft 2 T : ht(yt)  ht(xt)g = 1 and ft 2 T : ht(yt) > ht(xt)g > 0.
Remark 6.5. It is straightforward to check that competitive and private core allocations are
Pareto optimal.
The main motivation in considering (exact) equality in the feasibility constraints is the
theorem below where we show that if free disposal is not allowed in the feasibility constraints
then every Pareto optimal assignment is coalitional incentive compatibility. A straightfor-
ward consequence is that contracts of every competitive or private core allocations are en-
forceable.
Theorem 6.1. Every (exact) feasible Pareto optimal assignment (and thus every competitive or
private core allocation) is coalitional incentive compatible.
Versions of Theorem 6.1 have been proved in Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993), Krasa
and Yannelis (1994) and Hahn and Yannelis (2001). For the sake of completeness, we
propose a detailed proof.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Let x 2 SX be a feasible assignment that is Pareto optimal and assume
by way of contradiction that there exist a coalition S 2  with (S) 2 (0,1) and two states
 6=  such that
1. for -a.e. t 62 S, for every a 2 EI(S)(), the states a and  are not distinguishable, i.e.,
 2 Et(a);
2. for -a.e. t 2 S, for every a 2 EI(S)(), we have
et(a)+zt() 2 R
L
+ and ut(a,et(a)+zt()) > ut(a, xt(a)),
where zt(!) := xt(!)  et(!) for every ! 2 
.
We consider now the function y : T ! R
L deﬁned by
8t 2 S, 8! 2 
, yt(!) =
¨
et(!)+zt() if ! 2 EI(S)()
xt(!) if ! 62 EI(S)()
and
8t 62 S, 8! 2 
, yt(!) = xt(!).
The function yt is Ft-measurable for -a.e. t 2 T. Moreover for each ! 2 
, the vec-
tor yt(!) belongs to RL
+. Therefore y is a private assignment, i.e., y 2 SX. We have
19ut(!,et(!) + z()) > ut(!, xt()) for -a.e. t 2 S and every ! 2 EI(S)(), which implies
that ht(yt) > ht(xt). We have thus proved that
ft 2 T : ht(yt)  ht(xt)g = 1
and
ft 2 T : ht(yt) > ht(xt)g = (S) > 0.
In order to get a contradiction, it is now sufﬁcient to prove that y is a feasible assignment.







































































Remark 6.6. Observe that the exact feasibility constraints plays a crucial role in the proof of
Theorem 6.1.
23In this argument it is crucial that for every information type j 2 I(T nS) and for every possible state of nature
a 2 EI(S)(), agents with information type j cannot discern  and a.
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